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Abstract We establish universal bounds for asset prices in heterogeneous complete
market economies with scale invariant preferences. Namely, for each agent in the
economy we consider an artificial homogeneous economy populated solely by this
agent, and calculate the “homogeneous” price of an asset in each of these economies.
Dumas (Rev. Financ. Stud. 2, 157–188, 1989) conjectured that the risk free rate in
a heterogeneous economy must lie in the interval determined by the minimal and
maximal of the “homogeneous” risk free rates. We show that the answer depends on
the risk aversions of the agents in the economy: the upper bound holds when all risk
aversions are smaller than one, and the lower bound holds when all risk aversions
are larger than one. The bounds almost never hold simultaneously. Furthermore, we
prove these bounds for arbitrary assets.
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1 Introduction
In a heterogeneous economy, the wealth fluctuates randomly between different
agents. Obviously, an agent who is rich in a particular state will have a large in-
fluence on asset prices in that state. For example, if this agent owns almost all goods
in the economy, the asset prices will be very close to the prices that would prevail in
a homogeneous economy populated by this single agent. Thus, it is natural that these
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“homogeneous” prices in the artificial economies populated by one or another single
agent play an important role in determining the behavior of asset prices.
In a production economy with two agents, Dumas [6] conjectured that the risk
free rate in a heterogeneous economy should lie between the maximal and the mini-
mal “homogeneous” risk free rates of the artificial economies. Wang [13] considered
a continuous time version of our economy with a geometric Brownian motion aggre-
gate endowment and two agents having identical discount factors and risk aversions
1 and 0.5. He showed by numerical simulations that the bounds conjectured by Du-
mas [6] do not hold.
In this paper we correct and resolve this conjecture for a general heterogeneous
economy with CRRA preferences. Our results can be directly extended to any scale
invariant preferences, including heterogeneous beliefs (such as Wang [11, 12]) and
state dependent preferences generated by habit formation (such as, e.g., Constanti-
nides [5] and Abel [1]). Even though we work in discrete time, all our results literally
hold for continuous time economies.
In [9], we developed a tool that makes it possible to analyze many aspects of
general heterogeneous economies. Precisely, we construct an explicit “aggregator”
function of as many variables as there are agents. The equilibrium state price density
of the heterogeneous economy is equal to the aggregator function evaluated at the
state price densities of artificial homogeneous economies populated by exactly one
agent from the heterogeneous economy. Analytic properties of the aggregator func-
tion translate directly into economic mechanisms. The main technical result of this
paper is the observation that the aggregator function is convex (concave) when all risk
aversions are smaller (larger) than one. This important property corrects and resolves
the conjecture of Dumas [6].
There are many papers that investigate the influence of heterogeneity on asset
prices. See, e.g., Wang [11, 12], Gollier and Zeckhauser [7].
A special case of our model is considered by Wang [13] in a continuous time
setting. He examined the case of two agents with identical discount factors and very
special choices of risk aversion and studied Pareto-efficient allocations.
Dumas [6] numerically analyzed a model closely related to ours (and, of course,
the model of Wang [13]). He simulated a two agent production economy and obtained
a detailed description of consumption, portfolio and wealth allocations and their in-
tertemporal dynamics. He also studied the behavior of short term risk free rates and
discovered several interesting properties of those.
Chan and Kogan [3] analyzed a similar model with heterogeneous risk aversion
and habit formation, but only when heterogeneity is small (weak), and used pertur-
bation theory to determine the status of several stylized facts.
Lengwiler [8] considered an economy with heterogeneous discount factors. Ben-
ninga and Mayshar [2] investigated a one-period economy with heterogeneous risk
aversions and discount factors and showed that the conventional representative agent
has a decreasing risk aversion. They studied implications of this phenomenon for op-
tion pricing. Gollier and Zeckhauser [7] analyzed Pareto-efficient allocations in het-
erogeneous economies with general utility functions and discovered some interesting
aggregation phenomena. There are also aggregation results (see [4, 10]) justifying the
conventional representative agent approach.
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2 The model
The model is identical to that of [9], Sect. 2. We briefly recall the setup for the reader’s
convenience.
We assume a discrete time, pure exchange economy with a single perishable
consumption good (numeraire). The aggregate endowment stream Wt, t = 0, . . . , T ,
equivalently, the single good stream, is an arbitrary, positive process. The stream
is normalized by W0 = 1. The information structure is encoded in the filtration
(Ft , t = 0, . . . , T ) on the underlying probability space (Ω,B,P ) and generated by
the aggregate endowment process (Wt).
The economy is populated by n CRRA agents labeled by i, i = 1, . . . , n. We de-
note by N = {1, . . . , n} the set of all agents.
Agent i has a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. He chooses
his random consumption xit at each time t = 0, . . . , T and in each possible state of
the world to maximize his expected discounted intertemporal utility
E
[
T∑
t=0
δti
x
1−γi
it − 1
1 − γi
]
.
Here, γi is the relative risk aversion of agent i and δi is his discount factor (pa-
tience). Agent i is endowed with the fraction ηi of the aggregate endowment and∑n
i=1 ηi = 1.
3 Market equilibrium and state price densities
We assume that the market is dynamically complete. In this case, equilibrium al-
locations are Pareto-efficient and are uniquely determined by specifying the initial
consumption xi0 for each agent i. Furthermore, any equilibrium can be characterized
as an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium via the unique (because of market completeness)
state price density process M = (Mt). See also [9]. The corresponding equilibrium
equations for the state price densities take the form
n∑
i=1
xit = Wt (3.1)
for all t = 1, . . . , T (equilibrium market clearing at time zero follows from Walras’
law), with the equilibrium optimal consumption
xit = δtbii M−bit xi0.
Here, bi is the reciprocal of relative risk aversion, bi = 1/γi . It is usually referred to
as cautiousness.
In the homogeneous economy populated by a single agent with parameters (δi, γi),
state price densities Mt are given by δtiW
−γi
t (this follows directly from (3.1)). When
agents are heterogeneous, state price densities change over time and fluctuate be-
tween the “representative” state prices δtiW
−γi
t . A similar phenomenon takes place
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for all asset prices. Basing on extensive numerical analysis, Dumas [6] conjectured
that risk free rates in a heterogeneous production economy must stay within the inter-
val between the minimal and the maximal “representative” risk free rates. Wang [13]
has shown that this is not true in a two agent continuous time analogue of our econ-
omy.
As mentioned in the introduction, the relationship between equilibrium state price
densities and the representative state price densities is determined by the aggregator
function, constructed in [9]. We recall this representation (Proposition 4.1 in [9]),
including new, simple, but important bounds for the aggregator function.
Proposition 3.1 The τ -period stochastic discount factor Mt+τ /Mt satisfies
Mt+τ
Mt
= Ft
(
δτ1
(
Wt+τ
Wt
)−γ1
, . . . , δτn
(
Wt+τ
Wt
)−γn)
,
where Ft = Ft (y1, . . . , yn) is the unique solution to
n∑
i=1
F
−bi
t y
bi
i
(
xitW
−1
t
) = 1.
The aggregator function Ft satisfies the inequality maxi yi ≥ Ft ≥ mini yi .
Proof The representation for Mt is a direct consequence of the equilibrium equa-
tions (3.1); see [9], Proposition 4.1 for a proof. It remains to prove the bounds. For
simplicity, we do this only for F0 = F . Suppose that F > maxi yi . Then we get a
contradiction from
1 =
n∑
i=1
F−bi ybii xi0 <
n∑
i=1
(
yi/max
i
yi
)bi
xi0 ≤
n∑
i=1
xi0 = 1,
where the last identity is the equilibrium market clearing at time zero. The second
bound is proved similarly. 
By the definition of state price densities, under the standard no bubble condition,
the price P Dt at time t of an asset with dividend process D = (Dt , t = 1, . . . , T ) is
given by
P Dt = Et
[
T −t∑
τ=1
Mt+τ
Mt
Dt+τ
]
.
4 Convexity and concavity of the aggregator function
Definition 4.1 Let H ⊂ Rn be a convex set. A function f : H → R is called affine
linear if
m∑
i=1
λif (hi) = f
(∑
i
λihi
)
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for any m ≥ 1, vectors hi ∈ H, i = 1, . . . ,m and weights λi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,m with∑
i λi = 1.
It is easy to see that if F = ∑i=1 fi is affine linear on H and each fi is convex,
then each fi is itself affine linear on H .
Lemma 4.2 Let f : Rn → R be a convex function and X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) a random
vector Ω → Rn. Suppose also that (Ω,B) is separable. Let
supp(X) = {h ∈ Rn : essinf‖X − h‖ = 0}
be the essential image of the vector variable X (that is, the minimal support of its
distribution). Suppose that
E[X] = E[f (X1, . . . ,Xn)] = f (E[X1], . . . ,E[Xn]) = f (E[X]). (4.1)
Then the function f is affine linear on the closed convex hull of supp(X).
Proof The following fact is well known: if
f (λ0h0 + · · · + λh) =
∑
i=0
λif (hi) (4.2)
for some weights λk > 0,
∑
k=0 λk = 1 and vectors h0, . . . , h ∈ Rn, then the function
f is affine linear on the convex hull of the vectors h0, . . . , h.
Let {Ak}k=1,2,... be a sequence of subsets generating B. Consider the finite
σ -algebras Ω generated by Ak, k ≤ . Then, applying Jensen’s inequality twice, we
get
E
[
f (X)
] = E[E[f (X)|Ω]] ≥ E[f (E[X|Ω])] ≥ f (E[X])
and (4.1) implies that
E
[
f
(
E[X|Ω]
)] = f (E[X]).
Now, the random variable E[X|Ω] takes only a finite number of values, and
therefore the above fact implies that f is affine linear on the convex hull of
supp(E[X|Ω]). The claim follows by passing to the limit. 
We will also need
Lemma 4.3 Let F(x1, . . . , xn, y) : Rn+1+ → R be a differentiable convex (con-
cave) function. Suppose that for each (x1, . . . , xn) there exists a unique solution
y = y(x1, . . . , xn) to the equation
F(x1, . . . , xn, y) = 0
and that
∂F
∂y
∣∣∣∣
(x1,...,xn,y(x1,...,xn))
< 0
416 S. Malamud
for all (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+. Then
(1) the function y : Rn+ → R+ is convex (concave);
(2) if the function y is affine linear on a convex set H ⊂ Rn, then the function F is
affine linear on the convex hull of the set
H1 :=
{(
x, y(x)
)|x ∈ H}.
Proof (1) Let F be convex. Suppose that the function y(x1, . . . , xn) is not convex.
Then there exist vectors h1, h2 ∈ Rn such that
y
(
(h1 + h2)/2
)
>
(
y(h1) + y(h2)
)
/2. (4.3)
Note that, since F is convex, the derivative ∂F/∂y increases in y and therefore, by
the assumption made, we have
∂F
∂y
< 0
if y ≤ y(x1, . . . , xn). In particular, the function g(y) = F((h1 + h2)/2, y) decreases
in y on the segment (0, y((h1 +h2)/2). Therefore, using the definition of the function
y(x1, . . . , xn), convexity of F and monotonicity of F in y, we arrive at
0 = 1
2
F
(
h1, y(h1)
) + 1
2
F
(
h2, y(h2)
)
> F
(
(h1 + h2)/2,
(
y(h1) + y(h2)
)
/2
)
> F
(
(h1 + h2)/2, y
(
(h1 + h2)/2
)) = 0. (4.4)
Thus, we have reached a contradiction. The proof of the case when F is concave is
completely identical; all inequality signs are simply reversed.
(2) Let h1, . . . , hm ∈ H , and let λ1, . . . , λm > 0 be any weights, ∑i λi = 1. We
have
0 =
m∑
i=1
λmF
(
hm,y(hm)
)
= F
(
m∑
i=1
λmhm,y
(
m∑
i=1
λmhm
))
= F
(
m∑
i=1
λm
(
hm,y(hm)
))
, (4.5)
since y is affine linear on H . The claim follows from Lemma 4.2. 
Lemma 4.4 The function f (M,a) := M1−bab : R2+ → R is convex if b ≥ 1 and
concave if 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. If b = 0,1, then the function f (M,a) is affine linear on the
segment (M1, a1)+ t (M2 −M1, a2 − a1), t ∈ [0,1], between the points (M1, a1) and
(M2, a2) if and only if M1a−11 = M2a−12 .
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Proof A smooth function is convex (concave) if and only if its Hessian is nonnegative
(nonpositive) definite. We have
H(f ) :=
(
fMM faM
fMa faa
)
= M1−babb(b − 1)
(
M−2 −M−1a−1
−M−1a−1 a−2
)
. (4.6)
The matrix (
M−2 −M−1a−1
−M−1a−1 a−2
)
is nonnegative definite, and the claim follows, since b(b − 1) ≥ 0 for b ≥ 1 and ≤ 0
for b ∈ [0,1]. As for the second statement, the function is affine linear if and only if
its second derivative with respect to t vanishes. By (4.6), this means that
Ma−1 = (M2 − M1)(a2 − a1)−1
for any point (M,a) on the segment. The claim follows. 
Proposition 4.5 Let Ft be the aggregator function defined in Proposition 3.1. Then
(1) If γi ≤ 1 for all i then Ft : Rn+ → R+ is a convex function.
(2) If γi ≥ 1 for all i then Ft is a concave function.
Proof For simplicity, let t = 0. Consider the function
G(a1, . . . , an,M) =
∑
i∈N
M1−bi abii xi0 − M. (4.7)
Recall that bi = γ −1i . It follows from Proposition 3.1 that G(a1, . . . , an,M) = 0 if
and only if M = F0(a1, . . . , an), where F0 is the aggregator function.
(1) The function fi(M,ai) := M1−bi abii is convex for each i by Lemma 4.4. As a
sum of convex functions, G is hence again convex. Since γi ≤ 1 for all i, bi ≥ 1,
and therefore ∂G
∂M
< 0. By Lemma 4.3, F0 is convex.
(2) In the case where γi ≥ 1 for all i (i.e., bi ≤ 1), the function G is concave by
Lemma 4.4. Note that G is not globally decreasing, but it fulfills the weaker
monotonicity assumption of Lemma 4.3. In fact, we have
∂G
∂M
=
∑
i∈N
(1 − bi)M−bi abii xi0 − 1,
and if M is a solution to (3.1), then∑
i∈N
(1 − bi)M−bi abii xi0 − 1
≤ max
i
(1 − bi)
∑
i∈N
M−bi abii xi0 − 1 = max
i
(1 − bi) − 1 < 0. (4.8)
Thus, the conditions of Lemma 4.3 are satisfied and the required concavity of F0
follows. 
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5 Universal bounds for asset prices
By Proposition 3.1, the state price densities (SPDs) by themselves do lie between the
maximal and minimal “homogeneous” state price densities. Depending on the state of
the economy, the SPDS are closer to the representative SPD of the agent dominating
in this state. But asset prices are expectations of state price densities multiplied by
dividends, and the expectation of the maximum of a family of random variables is
always larger than the maximum of the expectations. In particular,
E
[
max
i
δtiW
−γi
t
]
> max
i
E
[
δtiW
−γi
t
]
.
Proposition 3.1 implies that the price of a risk free bond satisfies
BF(0, t) = E[Mt ] ≤ E
[
max
i
δtiW
−γi
t
]
,
but Dumas’ conjecture is the much stronger statement
E[Mt ] ≤ max
i
E
[
δtiW
−γi
t
]
.
When risk aversions are homogeneous, the maximum maxi δtiW
−γi
t is always attained
by the agent with the largest discount factor. When risk aversions are heterogeneous,
the maximum is attained by different agents in different states. This is the source of
the problem.
We will need a
Definition 5.1 Let
Mht (δ, γ ) = δtW−γt
be the state price density process in the homogeneous economy populated solely by
one agent with discount factor δ and risk aversion γ . Similarly, for any asset with a
dividend process D,
P
(D)
ht (δ, γ ) = Et
[
T −t∑
τ=1
Mh,t+τ
Mht
(δ, γ )Dt+τ
]
is the asset price in the corresponding homogeneous economy. In particular,
BFh (t1, t2)(δ, γ ) is the homogeneous bond price.
The following theorem clarifies Dumas’ conjecture.
Theorem 5.2 We have:
− If γi ≥ 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n then
P Dt ≤ max
i
P Dht (δi , γi).
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− If γi ≤ 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n then
P Dt ≥ min
i
P Dht (δi , γi).
If not all risk aversions are identical and Wt is not constant, then all inequalities
above are strict.
Proof For simplicity, we prove the result only for t = 0. The general case follows by
the same arguments with the help of Proposition 3.1.
Let γi ≤ 1 for all i. By Proposition 4.5, F0 is convex. Consider now the extended
probability space Ω ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ω consisting of T identical copies of Ω and endowed
with probability measure
dP T = 1
T
dP ⊕ · · · ⊕ dP,
where dP is the original probability measure on Ω . Then, each process A =
(A1, . . . ,AT ) can be viewed as a random variable on the extended probability space
and
ET [A] = 1
T
T∑
t=1
E[At ].
Proposition 3.1 means that
M = F (Mh(δ1, γ1), . . . ,Mh(δn, γn)),
where M = (Mt) is the equilibrium state price density process and F = F0. Obvi-
ously, F is homogeneous of degree one and therefore
DM = F (DMh(δ1, γ1), . . . ,DMh(δn, γn)).
Using Proposition 4.5, Jensen’s inequality and the estimate of Proposition 3.1, we get
T −1P D0 = T −1
T∑
t=1
E[DtMt ] = ET [DM]
= ET [F (DMh(δ1, γ1), . . . ,DMh(δn, γn))]
≥ F (ET [DMh(δ1, γ1)], . . . ,ET [DMh(δn, γn)])
= F (T −1P Dh0(δ1, γ1), . . . , T −1P Dh0(δn, γn))
≥ T −1 min
i
P Dh0(δi, γi). (5.1)
The proof for the case γi ≥ 1 is completely similar and obtained by reversing all
inequalities.
It remains to prove that the inequalities are strict. We only treat the case when
γi ≥ 1 for all i and t = 0. The other cases are completely analogous. Suppose that
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there is an identity in (5.1) and risk aversions are heterogeneous. That is, there exist
(bi, δi), i = 1, . . . , n such that bi = γ −1i are heterogeneous and
ET
[
F
(
DMh(δ1, γ1), . . . ,DMh(δn, γn)
)]
= F (ET [DMh(δ1, γ1)], . . . ,ET [DMh(δn, γn)]). (5.2)
By Lemma 4.2, identity (5.2) implies that F is affine linear on the convex hull H of
supp(X) with
X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) =
(
DMh(δ1, γ1), . . . ,DMh(δn, γn)
)
.
By Lemma 4.3, (2), this is only possible if the function
G(x1, . . . xn, y) =
∑
i∈N
y1−bi xbii
is affine linear on the convex hull H1 of supp{(X,F (X))}. Therefore, each function
y1−bi abii should be affine linear on this convex hull. By Lemma 4.4, this is only
possible if
hiF (h)
−1 = giF (g)−1 (5.3)
for all h,g ∈ H and all i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, all vectors h ∈ supp(X) should be co-
linear and there exist a scalar random variable z and a vector h ∈ Rn such that(
DMh(δ1, γ1), . . . ,DMh(δn, γn)
) = zh
almost surely. Let for simplicity γ1 = γ2. The above identity implies that
Mh(δ1, γ1)
Mh(δ2, γ2)
= DMh(δ1, γ1)
DMh(δ2, γ2)
= h1
h2
is a constant. But Mh(δ, γ ) = (δtW−γt ), and the last identity is impossible if Wt is
random. This gives a contradiction. 
When risk aversions are homogeneous and equal γ , the aggregator function has a
simple structure; we get Mt = (∑ni=1(δtiW−γt )bxi0)1/b , with b = γ −1. In particular,
when all risk aversions equal one, the aggregator function is linear and state price
densities are simply linear combinations of representative state price densities. When
risk aversions are heterogeneous, the structure becomes quite complicated, but risk
aversion equal to one remains a natural threshold for convexity/concavity.
The bounds of Theorem 5.2 are important for empirical applications because they
are universal and hold for all time periods. For example, it is known that the real
world price-dividend ratios are highly volatile. The bounds of Theorem 5.2 show that
the size of the interval in which the P-D ratios fluctuate depends on the heterogeneity.
In particular, one can use real data and Theorem 5.2 to understand the strength of
heterogeneity in the real world.
Finally, we give a general result stating that Dumas’ conjecture is wrong in gen-
eral.
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Proposition 5.3 Suppose that W = (Wt) is not almost surely constant. Fix an asset
with dividend process D. Then, for any collection of heterogeneous risk aversions
γ1, . . . , γn such that either γi ≥ 1 for all i or γi ≤ 1 for all i, there exists a collection
of discount factors δ1, . . . , δn such that one of the inequalities
min
i
P Dht (δi , γi) ≤ P Dt ≤ max
i
P Dht (δi , γi) (5.4)
is violated.
Proof By construction, we can always choose a collection of δ1, . . . , δn in (0,1) such
that
P Dht (δi ,γi) = P Dht (δj ,γj )
for all i, j . In this case (5.4) turns into an identity and Theorem 5.2 implies that (5.4)
cannot hold, since the inequalities must be strict. 
6 Risk aversion on both sides of one
It is possible to extend the results of the previous section to the general case when the
risk aversions of heterogeneous agents lie on both sides of one.
Let
γ¯ := max
{
1,max
i
γi
}
≥ 1
and
γ := min
{
1,min
i
γi
}
≤ 1.
We can rewrite the equation for M in the form
∑
i∈N
(
M
1/γ
t
)−biγ (δt/γi W−γi/γt )biγ xi0 = 1,
or ∑
i∈N
(
M
1/γ¯
t
)−bi γ¯ (δt/γ¯i W−γi/γ¯t )bi γ¯ xi0 = 1.
By definition of γ , we have biγ ≤ 1 for all i and, similarly, bi γ¯ ≥ 1 for all i. There-
fore, the same arguments as above apply. The only problem is for assets with multi-
period payoffs, because then powers of the number of periods arise. For simplicity,
we formulate the result only for zero coupon risk free bonds.
Proposition 6.1 The price BF(t, t + τ) of a zero coupon risk free bond satisfies
min
i
(
Et
[
δ
τ/γ¯
i
(
Wt+τ
Wt
)−γi/γ¯ ])γ¯
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≤ BF(t, t + τ) ≤ max
i
(
Et
[
δ
τ/γ
i
(
Wt+τ
Wt
)−γi/γ ])γ
, (6.1)
and all inequalities are strict if risk aversions are heterogeneous and W is not almost
surely constant.
Proof For brevity, we write down the argument only for prices at time zero. Hölder’s
inequality and Theorem 5.2 together yield
E[Mt ] ≤
(
E
[
M
1/γ
t
])γ ≤ max
i
(
E
[
δ
t/γ
i W
−γi/γ
t
])γ
.
The same argument applies to the lower bounds. 
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